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The “hard-easy effect” is a well-known cognitive bias on self-confidence calibration that refers to a 
tendency to overestimate the probability of success in hard-perceived tasks, and to underestimate it in 
easy-perceived tasks. This paper provides a target-based foundation for this effect, and predicts its 
occurrence in the expected utility framework when utility functions are S-shaped and asymmetrically 
tailed. First, we introduce a definition of hard-perceived and easy-perceived task based on the mismatch 
between an uncertain target to meet and a suitably symmetric reference point. Second, switching from a 
target-based language to a utility-based language, we show how this maps to an equivalence between the 
hard-perceived target/gain seeking and the easy-perceived target/loss aversion. Third, we characterize the 
agent’s miscalibration in self-confidence. Finally, we derive sufficient conditions for the “hard-easy 
effect” and the “reversed hard-easy effect” to hold.  
Keywords: Expected utility, Hard-easy effect bias, Endowment effect bias, Sunk cost effect bias, 
Benchmarking procedure, Loss-gain asymmetry, van Zwet skewness conditions. 
JEL classification: C91; D81 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the 1970s an extensive experimental research has amassed evidence of systematic 
cognitive biases in individuals’ misperception on own performance. In this paper we 
focus on the well-known self-misconfidence bias called “hard-easy effect”, that refers to 
a tendency to overestimate the probability of success in hard-perceived tasks, and to 
underestimate it in easy-perceived tasks. The phenomenon was originally pinpointed by 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) and subsequently ample experimental literature has 
confirmed this human behavior; see Peon et al. (2014) and references therein. In recent 
years, many authors have attributed findings of misconfidence to psychological biases 
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occurring in specific economic environments; see e.g. Burks et al. (2013), Ludwig et al. 
(2011), Moore and Healy (2008), and references therein.  
This paper tackles the problem from a different perspective. We demonstrate sufficient 
conditions for an Expected Utility (EU) agent endowed with an asymmetric tailed S-
shaped utility function to act according to the “hard-easy effect” or its reversed effect. 
Our findings are achieved along the following steps.  
First, we present a characterization of hard-perceived and easy-perceived targets on the 
basis of the target distribution asymmetry. 
Second, we illustrate the link between the perceived-task difficulty and the perceived- 
gain-loss asymmetry. Following the seminal ideas of Borch (1968) and Berhold (1973), 
we normalize the agent utility function and interpret it as the cumulative distribution 
function (c.d.f.) of the uncertain target to meet. Then we extend the local definition of 
loss aversion given by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 279) to formalize the sentiment 
“losses loom larger than gains” over the wealth domain. In the same way we formalize 
the patterns “gains loom larger than losses” and “gains loom equal to losses”. Then we 
prove in Theorem 2 the equivalence of these patterns with the perception of easy, hard 
and well-calibrated tasks, respectively.  
Our results match the empirical evidence: underperforming an easy-perceived task 
(negatively) looms more than outperforming it; and vice versa, outperforming a hard-
perceived task (positively) looms larger than underperforming it. That behavior can be 
explained by the “endowment effect” (Kahneman et al., 1991) based on the fact that 
people ascribe more value to an object when they feel own than when they don’t.  
Third, we present the main contribution of the paper. We provide sufficient conditions 
for an EU agent to act according to the “hard-easy effect” or “reversed hard-easy 
effect”; see Theorem 3. They involve both the perception of task-difficulty and the 
“quality” of the lottery that the agent has at hand to successfully meeting the desired 
target. As a by-product we identify situations in enterprise risk management (ERM) 
where misconfidence in judgments emerges. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the 
definitions of hard-perceived and easy-perceived targets. In Section 3, we show the 
equivalence between the perceived loss-gain asymmetry and perceived task difficulty 
augmented by the so-called endowment effect. Sufficient conditions for the “hard-easy 
effect” and its reversed effect are set out in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the article. 
An Appendix collects the proofs. 
 
2. The task difficulty calibration: the van Zwet (1979) conditions 
Ample experimental psychology literature has investigated how an agent calibrates the 
subjective perception of task difficulty; see Lichtenstein et al. (1982), Yates (1990) 
among others.  
Intuitively a task is hard-perceived if the target to meet is most likely higher than the 
objective reference point; and vice versa if the target is lower; see Roy et al. (2013, p. 
201) for a discussion about the link between the target distribution asymmetry and the 
perceived task difficulty. 
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Clearly, a fundamental question is how to set the subjective and objective reference 
points. During the past two decades, that question has become a major research topic in 
the experimental and theoretical economics area, see, e.g., Heath et al. (1999), 
Hoffmann et al. (2013), and references therein. In experimental research the most 
common measure used is the median; see Heath et al. (1999). Given a random target T, 
the value m such that ( ) 0.5P T m< <  and ( ) 0.5P T m≥ ≥ is called a median of T. The 
median thus defined always exists, and is unique. Alternative definitions are possible, 
but they yield the same answer when the distribution of T is continuous and unimodal. 
Hereafter we consider only targets with unimodal distributions. 
In the next section we argue that the subjective reference point for a (strictly) unimodal 
target is better captured by its mode than by its median.  
 
2.1. The perceived central value: the role of the mode 
In real world situations targets are very often uncertain. This may occur when the agents 
are asked to outdo the competitors’ future performances. Or simply, the target may be 
vague at the time of decision, as is the case for a risky investment plan in view of 
achieving some target wealth at a future time. That is the case for an investor trying to 
forecast her future needs in order to pick the best retirement planning. The different the 
agent risk attitude, the different the perceived benchmark she feels she is asked to meet. 
Now we show a way to extract risk preference information from the target perception.  
As it was seminally discussed by Borch (1968) in the context of ruin probabilities, the 
agent utility function u is assumed bounded, increasing (but not constant) and 
continuous. Without loss of generality, by a positive affine transformation the cardinal 
utility u can be normalized so that ( )inf 0u x =  and ( )sup 1u x = . Then u satisfies all the 
properties characterizing a c.d.f. As Berhold (1973, p. 825) states “there are advantages 
to having the utility function represented by a distribution”, because that permits the use 
of the known properties of distribution functions to find analytic results. In fact, we 
have: 
( ) ( ) ( )u x P x T F x= ≥ =       (1) 
where F is the c.d.f. of the uncertain target T. This somewhat surprising equivalence 
states that the c.d.f. F of the target T just coincides with the normalized utility function 
u. To put it differently, Equation (1) tells us that we can think of the agent cardinal 
utility ( )u x  as the probability that the uncertain target T is not greater than x. For 
example, we can interpret ( )1u  as the probability that the agent target is not greater than 
1 euro, rather than as the cardinal utility of 1 euro, and vice versa.  
In this paper, the target T is assumed to be a unimodal variable about the mode M, i.e. 
( )F x  on the support ( ),a b  is convex for ( ),x a M∈  and concave for ( ),x M b∈ . (If T 
is not strictly unimodal, let M be the midpoint of the modal set.) By equivalence (1) it 
follows that the utility function u is S-shaped with the concavity switching point in 
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correspondence of the mode M. As a consequence the mode M is the subjectively 
perceived “watershed” value that divides the domain of losses from that of gains.  
Now we are ready to introduce the definition of hard-perceived and easy-perceived 
tasks by reformulating the van Zwet (1979) conditions for unimodal distributions. These 
are referred to the median m, that by virtue of its definition, objectively splits the values 
of a r.v. X into two equally likely sets of gains and losses. As we will see, it is the 
inherent tension between the “subjective” watershed M and the “objective” watershed m 
that underlies the hard-easy effect. 
 
Definition 1.  Let a unimodal continuous target T with median m taken as reference 
point and continuous c.d.f. F. Then T is called: 
a) a hard-perceived target with respect to m if ( ) ( )P T m x P T m x≤ − ≥ ≥ +  for 
any 0x ≥ ;  
b) an easy-perceived target with respect to m if ( ) ( )P T m x P T m x≤ − ≤ ≥ +  for 
any 0x ≥ ; 
c) a symmetric target with respect to m if ( ) ( )P T m x P T m x≤ − = ≥ +  for any 
0x ≥ . 
Most of the unimodal continuous asymmetric distributions satisfy conditions a) and b); 
whereas condition c) is the usual definition of a symmetric distribution. 
For example Gamma distributions, that include Exponential and Chi-square 
distributions as special cases, and Beta distributions satisfy condition b), see Abadir 
(2005). More generally, it can be easily proven that any Pearson distribution of Type I 
to XII satisfies inequality b)1. Note that distributions enjoying condition a) relate to 
those enjoying condition b). In fact, if a random variable X satisfies condition a), then its 
symmetric reversal ( ) 2Y X m m m X= − − + = −  satisfies condition b), and vice versa; 
this will be discussed in Sec. 4. 
Clearly, there exist asymmetric distributions that satisfy neither condition a) nor b). In 
such a case the agent perceives the target as neither hard nor easy, so the “hard-easy 
effect” does not apply. 
A simple necessary condition for testing the perceived difficulty is offered by the so-
called van Zwet mean-median-mode inequalities; see van Zwet (1979).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1A sufficient condition for inequality b) is that the probability density f of T satisfies for some 0ζ > , 
( ) ( ) 0f m x f m x− + + ≥  for 0 x ζ≤ ≤ and ( ) ( ) 0f m x f m x− + + ≤  for xζ < < ∞ , see Equation (2.1) 
van Zwet (1979). The probability density f of any Pearson distribution of Type I to XII satisfies the above 
condition; see also Sato (1997). 	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Theorem 1. Let a unimodal continuous target T with mean µ , median m and mode M.  
Then: 
a) if  T is a hard-perceived target, then m Mµ ≤ ≤ ; 
b) if T is an easy-perceived target, then M m µ≤ ≤ ; 
c) if T  is a symmetric-perceived target, then T is symmetric and M m µ= = . 
Proof. The definition of hard-perceived and easy-perceived task is equivalent with the 
van Zwet (1979) conditions. Mean-median-mode inequalities come from van Zwet 
(1979)’s Theorem.□ 
The alphabetical/counter-alphabetical order among mean, median and mode offers a 
quick-and-dirty test for task difficulty; however, it provides only a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. For a number of counter-examples, see Abadir (2005).  
The intuition underlying Theorem 1 follows. If the target is hard-perceived, then the 
agent sets her subjective reference point, i.e. the mode M, higher than the objective one, 
i.e. the median m; and vice versa if the target is easy-perceived. If the target is 
symmetric-perceived, the subjective and objective reference point coincides. 
 
3. The perceived loss-gain asymmetry in “the large” 
An S-shaped utility function may be asymmetrically tailed. As mentioned by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979, p. 279) the tail asymmetry captures the attitude that “losses loom 
larger than gains”, called “loss aversion”. That expresses the common sentiment that the 
disutility of losses exceeds the utility of commensurate gains. Although this pattern is  
one of the most robust findings in behavioral economics, recent studies have 
documented reversed preferences called “gain seeking” or “reversed-loss aversion”; see 
Moore and Cain (2007), and Sacchi and Stanca (2014).  
In the following we introduce a definition of the asymmetric loss-gain perception 
captured by the following statements: a) “gains loom larger than losses”; b) “losses 
loom larger than gains”; and c) “gains loom equal to losses”. These sentiments are 
assumed to hold at any level of the agent wealth. 
Definition 2. Let u be an increasing cardinal utility function with ( )0 1u x≤ ≤ . Given a  
reference point m, 
a) if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )u m x u m u m u m x+ − ≥ − −  for all 0x ≥ , then u exhibits gain seeking 
around m; 
b) if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )u m x u m u m u m x+ − ≤ − −  for all 0x ≥ , then u exhibits loss aversion 
around m; 




It is worthwhile pinpointing the link between Definition 2.b) and the notion of loss 
aversion introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 303), i.e., ( ) ( )' 'u x u x< −  for 
all 0x ≥ . The former provides a definition “in the large”, based on the absolute change 
in utility that holds for any m of the wealth domain; the latter applies “in the small” and 
is based on the marginal change in utility at 0m = . Clearly, if u is differentiable at 
0m = , the definition of loss aversion “in the large” implies that “in the small” given by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 303). 
If the median m of the target T is chosen as reference point, the notions of task difficulty 
and risk attitude overlap, as shown below. 
Theorem 2. Let T a hard/easy target according to Definition 1, with a continuous c.d.f. 
u and a median m. If the agent is endowed with an S-shaped utility function u, then 
a) u exhibits gain seeking around the median m if and only if the agent judges T a 
hard-perceived target around the median m; 
b) u exhibits loss aversion around the median m if and only if the agent judges T an 
easy-perceived target around the median m; 
c) u exhibits equal loss-gain weighting around the median m if and only if the 
agent judges T a symmetric-perceived target around the median m. 
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of the equivalence (1) between the c.d.f. F of 
the perceived target and the agent cardinal utility u. Since the reference point is the 
median m, substituting ( ) 0.5u m =  in the inequalities a), b) in Definition 2, the 
correspondent inequalities a), b) in Definition 1 come out, and vice versa. □ 
 
The equivalence between the gain seeking/hard-perceived and the loss aversion/easy-
perceived task has an intuitive explanation that matches the experimental evidence. That 
may be augmented by the so-called endowment effect (also called deprivation or 
divestiture aversion). 
Dealing with easy-perceived tasks the agent tends to feel the potential gains as virtually 
own. As a consequence, for the endowment effect, no-gains are felt as a deprivation. So 
the agent exhibits loss aversion when facing an easy-perceived task; see LiCalzi (1999). 
Vice versa, dealing with hard-perceived tasks the agent does not ascribe the possible 
gains as his own and no endowment effect appears. However, no-gains give no-
deprivation, but albeit gains are strongly sought. So, in the presence of hard-perceived 
tasks, the agent becomes a gain seeker. 
 
4. Misconfidence in hard and easy tasks 
According to Moore and Healy (2008) people may exhibit confidence miscalibration in 
three different ways: (1) in estimating their own performance (misconfidence); (2) in 
estimating their own performance relative to others (overplacement or ‘better-than-
average’ effect); (3) and having an excessive precision to estimate future uncertainty 
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(overprecision). In the paper at hand, we focus on the cognitive bias (1): the self-
misconfidence.  
Self-misconfidence has been long recognized since the pioneering works of Lichtenstein 
and Fischhoff (1977). Evidences document the presence of the “hard-easy task effect” 
that overconfidence is much prevalent if the commitments are difficult-perceived, 
whereas underconfidence prevails if they are easy-perceived.  
We build on the target-based interpretation and provide foundations for this behavior. 
Consequently, we demonstrate sufficient conditions for a rational agent abiding EU 
paradigms and endowed with an S-shaped utility to act according to the “hard-easy” and 
the “reversed hard-easy” effect. 
Before introducing the formal definition of misconfidence, let us gain an intuitive 
insight on this concept. The misconfidence is defined as the gap between the self-
confidence and the confidence of a well-calibrated agent, i.e. an individual who feels 
“gains loom equal to losses”. To formalize this ideal equidistance, we postulate for each 
target T a corresponding well-calibrated target 0T with the same median m and a 
distribution obtained by suitably symmetrizing the distribution of T. Its construction is 
the following. First, we demonstrate that for each hard-perceived (respectively, easy-
perceived) target, there is an opposite-perceived target. The proof is in the Appendix.  
 
Proposition 1. Let T a hard-perceived/easy-perceived target with respect to m, 
we call Y its opposite-perceived variable of T, if ( )Y m T m− = − − . Clearly, T and Y are 
symmetric with respect to m. If T is a hard-perceived/easy-perceived target, then its 
opposite-perceived variable Y is an easy/hard-perceived one, and vice versa.  
 
Second, we construct the symmetric benchmark 0T . Let T  and T two opposite-
perceived targets with c.d.f. u  and u , respectively. Let ( ) ( ) ( )0 2
u x u x
u x
+
=  for any x. 
Since ( ) ( )1u m x u m x− = − + , it follows immediately that ( ) ( )0 0 1u m x u m x− + + =  
for any x . So 0u  is the c.d.f. of a symmetric-perceived target 0T . We single out this 
choice for 0T because it is the only symmetric target for which 
( ) ( )0P m x T m x P m x T m x− ≤ ≤ + = − ≤ ≤ + 	  
holds for any 0x ≥ . 
Now we are ready to introduce the definition of self-misconfidence in meeting uncertain 
hard-perceived and easy-perceived targets. 
Definition 3. Let T a hard-perceived/easy-perceived target according to Definition 1, 
with c.d.f. u and median m. Given a lottery X:  
a) if ( ) ( )0P X T P X T> ≥ >  then the agent endowed with the utility function u 
exhibits overconfidence on X; 
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b) if ( ) ( )0P X T P X T> ≤ >  then the agent endowed with the utility function u 
exhibits underconfidence on X, 
where 0T  is the symmetric-perceived target with median m.  
 
4.1 Confidence miscalibration: the benchmarking procedure 
To circumvent the problem of eliciting beliefs about the probability of meeting an 
uncertain target, we reword it in the target-based language of the benchmarking 
procedure. Benchmarking is a prescriptive target-based model that satisfies von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947)’s and Savage (1954)’s axiomatization through a 
probabilistic and intuitive interpretation of the expected utility of a lottery X; see 
Castagnoli and LiCalzi (1996), Bordley and LiCalzi (2000). They show that the 
expected utility of a lottery X can be read as the probability that X outperforms a 
stochastically independent target T with c.d.f. u 
( ) ( )( )EP X T u X≥ = .    (2) 
This interpretation highlights the benchmark-procedure advantage: the subjective beliefs 
about the probability of successfully meeting the target constitute all that is needed to 
inform the subjective expected utility of the lottery at hand. The main result of this 
paper gives sufficient conditions for the “hard-easy” effect bias to occur.  
 
Theorem 3. (The “hard-easy effect” bias) Suppose that agent has a hard-perceived 
target T with c.d.f. u and median m. Let X be a lottery independent of T. Then the agent 
exhibits 
a) overconfidence if the support of X belongs to [ ),m +∞ , and 
b) underconfidence if the support of X belongs to ( ],m−∞ ; 
where m is the objective reference point. Correspondingly, if T is easy-perceived, then 
the agent exhibits underconfidence for lotteries over [ ),m +∞ , and	  overconfidence for 
lotteries over	   ( ],m−∞ . 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Theorem 3 gives a normative guideline to highlight circumstances where confidence is 
misaligned. When the target is hard-perceived, the agent is overconfident for lotteries 
with payoffs higher than the median (gains), and underconfident over lotteries 
delivering payoffs lower than the median (losses). When the target is easy-perceived, 
this pattern reverses. The “hard-easy” effect summarizes the two results over gains. The 
Theorem predicts a symmetric “easy-hard” effect over the domain of losses. 
Shifting from the target-language versus the loss-gain one, we reword our findings in 
the card game context. A player will be overconfident if: 
• she is a gain-seeker holding “trump cards”; or if 
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• she is a loss averter holding “bad cards”.  
Vice versa, she will be underconfident if: 
• she is a gain-seeker holding “bad cards”; or if  
• she is a loss-averter holding “trump cards”.  
These conclusions reflect well-known biases in cognitive psychology. Contrary to a 
common belief, it is not only risk-seeking players that may fall into the trap of 
overconfidence, but loss adverse players as well. An explanation of overconfidence in 
loss adverse agents is offered by the “sunk cost effect” also called the “Concorde effect” 
and the "commitment bias". That cognitive bias describes the phenomenon where 
people do not want to admit a failure in running a bad business. The probability of 
meeting the targets is overestimated and people go on "throwing good money after bad". 
A behavioral explanation for sunk cost effects was originally proposed by Thaler (1980) 
in relation with the presence of loss aversion and the endowment effect. However the 
sunk cost bias is still a questionable “fallacy” in psychology. Kelly (2004) legitimates 
the tendency of “honoring” sunk costs as rational driver. McAfee and al. (2010) argue 
that agents may rationally engage in sunk costs because of reputational concerns, or 
financial and time constraints. Our findings support this documented human behavior 
with sound normative motivations. 
Remark 1. Theorem 3 finds applications in business environments. According to the 
enterprise risk management (ERM) directives, managers should prudentially manage the 
risks and strategically seize the opportunities. To achieve this double objective it is 
essential to have an accurate grasp of the probability of succeeding the commitments 
(see Conine, 2014). Theorem 3 sheds light on circumstances where this judgment is 
normatively biased. Summing up, the decision maker will be prone to overconfidence if: 
• she is a risk-seeker and she is handling a very good business;  
• she is a loss averter and she is handling a very bad business. 
Vice versa, she will move to underconfidence if: 
• she is a risk-seeker and she is handling a very bad risky project;  
• she is loss averter and she is handling a very good risky project. 
Overconfidence in evaluating risks may end up in not defensible losses; on the other 
hand, underconfidence may lead to miss out on opportunities for gains because of a 
small risk of failure. Recognizing the influence of these cognitive biases on confidence 
miscalibrations can induce managers to be more mindful in decision making. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The cognitive bias “hard-easy effect” is a widely acknowledged phenomenon in human 
behavior documented by an ample literature on the experimental psychological 
economics. In this paper we study this bias and its reversed version from a normative 
perspective. We show that these effects are compatible with EU prescriptions for a 
rational agent endowed with an asymmetrically tailed S-shaped cardinal utility function. 
10	  
	  
The key reading of our findings is based on the equivalence between the asymmetry in 
task-difficulty and the asymmetry in loss-gain perception.  
Sufficient conditions for acting according to the “hard-easy effect” and the “reversed 
hard-easy effect” biases are set out. More specifically, these effects arise if the agent 
feels to face a hard or an easy task and the lottery at her disposal promises extremely 
good or extremely bad odds. As by-product we derive a normative guide for ERM to 
detect situations where confidence miscalibrations arise. Recognizing these cognitive 
biases, and being mindful of to be normatively influenced by them, gives the managers 
a better framework for decision making. 
Our findings suggest a novel normative reading of other cognitive biases in ERM, but 
that is left to future research. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
We will prove that if T is a hard-perceived/easy-perceived task with respect to m its 
opposite-perceived variable Y is an easy-perceived/hard-perceived task.  
Let T  a hard-perceived target with c.d.f. u . Construct the variable Y with c.d.f. u  such 
that ( )Y m T m− = − − . It follows that  
( ) ( )1u m x u m x+ = − −  for all 0x ≥ .     (3) 
In fact 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1u m x P Y m x P Y m x P T m x P T m x u m x+ = ≤ + = − ≤ = − − ≤ = ≥ − = − −
And analogously 
( ) ( )1u m x u m x− = − +  for all 0x ≥ .     (4) 
Summing up (3) and (4), we get 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1u m x u m x u m x u m x+ + − = − − + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ 
Since T  is a hard-perceived target, then ( ) ( ) 1 0u m x u m x− + + − ≥⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , so  
( ) ( ) 1u m x u m x+ + − ≤  for all 0x ≥ , 
Then by Definition 1.b) Y is an easy-perceived target. 
The two opposite-perceived targets have the same median m. In fact, if 0x = , it follows 
( ) ( )1 0.5u m u m= − = . If T is an easy-perceived target, the relations are reversed and 
the opposite-perceived variable Y can be proved to be hard-perceived. □ 
 
Proof of Theorem 3.  
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Let T a hard-perceived target with c.d.f. u  and T  its opposite-perceived variable with 
c.d.f. u , such that ( )T m T m− = − − . We will prove that the relation between u  and u  
switches at m. Specifically, ( ) ( )u m x u m x− ≤ −  and ( ) ( )u m x u m x+ ≤ + for any 
0x ≥ . 
Abdous and Theodorescu (1998, equation (2), p. 357) set the equivalence between the 
van Zwet conditions (1979, (1.2), p. 1) and the first stochastic order between the two 
tails of T around m, it holds 
( ) ( ) 1u m x u m x+ + − ≤  is equivalent to ( ) ( )stT m T m
+ −
− −f  and  
( ) ( ) 1u m x u m x+ + − ≥  is equivalent to ( ) ( )stT m T m
− +
− −f , 
where X ±  denote the positive (negative) part of X .  
Since ( )T m T m− = − −  we have ( ) ( )( ) ( )T m T m T m+ −+− = − − = − , then 
( ) ( )stT m T m
− −
− −f , so ( ) ( )u m x u m x− ≤ −  for 0x ≥  
And since ( ) ( )( ) ( )T m T m T m− − +− = − − = − , we have 
( ) ( )stT m T m
++
− −f , so ( ) ( )u m x u m x+ ≤ +  for 0x ≥  
The above can be rewritten as ( ) ( )u s u s≤  for s m≤  and ( ) ( )u s u s≥  for s m≥ . 
Let ( ) ( ) ( )0 2
u m x u m x
u m x
+ + +
+ =  for any x. By construction, it holds 
( ) ( ) ( )0u m x u m x u m x− ≤ − ≤ −  and ( ) ( ) ( )0u m x u m x u m x+ ≥ + ≥ +  for 0x ≥ . 
Let now quantify the probability that the lottery X outperforms the target T. Consider 
the lottery X such that: 
a) the outcomes of X belong on [ ),m +∞ . Since ( ) ( ) ( )0 0u s u s u s= ≤ =  for all 
s m< , following relation holds 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )0E < E Eu X u X u X< . 
Then 
( ) ( ) ( )0P X T P X T P X T≥ < ≥ < ≥ . 
So if the lottery X promises high stakes, all above or equal to the external reference 
point m, then the agent is prone to underconfidence in easy-perceived tasks, and to 
overconfidence in hard-perceived tasks. That risk attitude follows the “hard-easy 
effect”. 
b) The outcomes of X belong on ( ],m−∞ . Since ( ) ( ) ( )0 0u s u s u s= ≤ =  for all 
s m> , following relation holds 
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( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )0E < E Eu X u X u X< . 
Then 
( ) ( ) ( )0P X T P X T P X T≥ < ≥ < ≥ . 
So if the lottery X promises bad outcomes, all below or equal to the external 
reference point m, then the agent is prone to underconfidence in hard-perceived 
tasks, and to overconfidence in easy-perceived tasks. That risk attitude follows the 
“reversed hard-easy effect”.□ 
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